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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal is from the dismissal of all counts of a 
complaint filed by Crossroads Cogeneration Corporation 
("Crossroads") against Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 
("O&R"). The district court dismissed Crossroads' breach of 
contract claim and related claims on the ground that they 
were barred by issue and claim preclusion, and dismissed 
Crossroads' antitrust claims for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. We will reverse in part 
and affirm in part. 
 
I. 
 
Crossroads, a Delaware company, is an independent 
producer of electric power that owns and operates a 
cogeneration facility in Mahwah, New Jersey, its principal 
place of business. O&R is a New York corporation that 
operates as a public utility in four counties in New York, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In each county in which 
O&R operates, it is virtually the sole retail provider of 
electric power to residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers. Most of the energy O&R provides to customers 
is purchased from relatively small, independent generators 
of energy, such as Crossroads. This dispute arises from a 
power purchase agreement governing the sale to O&R of 
electricity generated by Crossroads. Before examining the 
dispute in any detail, however, it is first necessary to review 
the regulatory context of the agreement. 
 
A. 
 
Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. S 791a et seq., 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") is 
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responsible for regulating "public utilities" that offer electric 
power in interstate commerce. In the midst of a national 
energy crisis in 1978, Congress modified the Federal Power 
Act by enacting the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
("PURPA"), 16 U.S.C. S 823a et seq. Congress' overall 
strategy was to "control power generation costs and ensure 
long-term economic growth by reducing the nation's 
reliance on oil and gas and increasing the use of more 
abundant, domestically produced fuels." Freehold 
Cogeneration Associates, L.P. v. Board of Regulatory 
Comm'rs of New Jersey, 44 F.3d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1995). 
One chosen means to this broad end was to encourage the 
development of cogeneration facilities, which produce both 
electric and thermal energy from a single fuel source. 
 
Developing a market for cogeneration facilities required 
overcoming both the reluctance of traditional electric 
utilities to purchase power from independent providers and 
the financial burden of state and federal regulation on 
nontraditional facilities. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 750-51 (1982). To address the first barrier, PURPA 
creates incentives by requiring FERC to prescribe "such 
rules as it determines necessary to encourage cogeneration 
and small power production," including rules to"require 
electric utilities to offer to . . . purchase electric energy from 
[cogeneration] facilities." 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(a). At the same 
time, to address the burden of regulation, PURPA requires 
FERC to prescribe rules to exempt small production 
facilities from many provisions of the Federal Power Act and 
"from State laws and regulations respecting the rates, or 
respecting the financial or organizational regulation, of 
electric utilities." 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(e). 
 
Acting pursuant to its authority under PURPA, FERC has 
promulgated regulations governing transactions between 
cogeneration facilities and electric utilities, including 
provisions requiring electric utilities to purchase energy 
from qualifying facilities ("QFs") at a rate up to the utility's 
full avoided cost.1 In addition, FERC has also promulgated 
regulations exempting QFs from state regulatory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In order to qualify as a QF, a cogeneration facility must meet 
requirements established by FERC. See 18 C.F.R. S 292.101 et seq. 
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requirements. Those regulations provide, in relevant part, 
that: 
 
       Any qualifying facility shall be exempted . . . from State 
       law or regulation respecting: 
 
       (i) The rates of electric utilities; and 
 
       (ii) The financial and organizational regulation  of 
       electric utilities. 
 
18 C.F.R. S 292.602(c)(1). 
 
Despite the existence of FERC regulations governing QFs 
and the exemption of QFs from certain federal and state 
regulations applicable to traditional electric utilities, state 
regulatory authorities are required to implement FERC 
rules. See 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3(f). Thus state agencies are 
actively involved in the formation and performance of 
contracts between traditional utilities and QFs; in 
particular, state authorities must review and approve power 
purchase agreements before they take effect. 
 
B. 
 
In October 1987, O&R entered into a contract with a QF 
for the purchase of electric energy for a period of twenty 
years. In 1990, Crossroads purchased the QF 's facility and 
it assigned the agreement to Crossroads.2  Pursuant to 
FERC regulations, the agreement required approval by the 
New York Public Service Commission ("NYPSC"), the state 
agency responsible for regulating electric utilities. After 
several changes were made at the NYPSC's request, the 
required approval was granted in December of 1988. The 
agreement provided that Crossroads' predecessor would 
supply energy to O&R from a cogeneration facility that 
"initially will be designed to generate nominally 3.3 MW of 
capacity and to generate approximately 26,300 MWH of 
electric energy annually." App. at 65. The facility was 
initially constructed with three combustion engines, each of 
which had a generating capacity of approximately 1.1 MW. 
However, the agreement anticipated that the plant might 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is undisputed that Crossroads is a "qualifying facility." 
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eventually grow in size, and the parties accordingly agreed 
upon the disposition of any capacity in excess of 3.3 MW: 
 
       [Crossroads] shall deliver and sell to [O&R] and [O&R] 
       shall accept and purchase from [Crossroads], subject 
       to the terms and conditions of this agreement, all the 
       capacity produced by the Plant, up to a maximum of 4 
       MW, and all energy associated with such capacity, net 
       of that capacity and energy used from time to time to 
       operate the Plant. No change in the amount of capacity 
       committed hereunder shall be permitted without the 
       written consent of [O&R] and [Crossroads]. 
       [Crossroads] shall have the right to sell to third parties 
       or make alternate dispositions of all the capacity 
       produced by the Plant in excess of 4 MW and all energy 
       associated with such excess capacity; provided, 
       however, that [O&R] shall have a right offirst refusal to 
       purchase such excess capacity and energy for the price 
       set forth herein. 
 
App. at 70. 
 
Thus, despite the 3.3 MW initial capacity, the agreement 
(1) requires O&R to purchase at the contract price all 
energy produced up to 4 MW; (2) reserves to O&R a right of 
first refusal in allocating any energy in excess of 4 MW; and 
(3) provides that Crossroads may sell on the open market 
any energy above 4 MW that O&R refuses. 
 
This dispute arose in May 1996, when Crossroads 
constructed and began operating a new gas turbine at the 
facility, capable of generating 5 MW of power. O&R refused 
to pay the contract price for energy generated by the new 
turbine, while Crossroads claimed that O&R was obligated 
under the agreement to purchase all energy generated by 
the original or new equipment up to a capacity of 4 MW. 
O&R filed a petition with the NYPSC asking for a 
declaratory ruling that it was not obligated to"purchase 
energy produced by the [new] Turbine at the prices set forth 
in the Agreement." App. at 63. Though acknowledging that 
the terms of the agreement required it to purchase "all the 
capacity produced by the Plant up to a maximum of 4 MW," 
App. at 57, O&R argued that it would nonetheless be unfair 
to require it to purchase energy from the new turbine. 
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O&R's petition contended that the rates set forth in the 
agreement are substantially higher than the market would 
bear today, a result of policies in the 1980s that provided 
subsidies to cogeneration facilities. Since the plant's 
capacity was 3.3 before addition of the new turbine, O&R 
had not been paying for the full 4 MW of energy prior to 
addition of the new turbine. With the new turbine, 
Crossroads would easily fulfill the 4 MW that O&R was 
obliged to purchase under the agreement. Because O&R is 
locked into what it perceives is above-market rates, it 
charged that Crossroads was "seek[ing] to circumvent the 
terms and spirit of the Agreement by supplementing the 
availability of the Original Generators with the output from 
the Turbine." App. at 61. O&R estimated that it would be 
required to pay an additional $4.2 million to Crossroads for 
the additional energy over the life of the contract, 
concluding that "[r]equiring [its] ratepayers to subsidize 
Crossroads [was] simply inappropriate." App. at 61. 
 
Crossroads opposed O&R's petition before the NYPSC. 
Citing a decision of this Circuit, Freehold Cogeneration 
Associates v. Board of Regulatory Comm'rs of New Jersey, 
44 F.3d 1178 (3d Cir. 1995), Crossroads argued that once 
a state utility commission approves the terms of a power 
purchase agreement, "any action . . . to reconsider its 
approval" is preempted by PURPA. 44 F.3d at 1194. 
Crossroads also cited NYPSC precedent suggesting that the 
agency usually refused to get involved in contract disputes 
between utilities and their suppliers. Finally, Crossroads 
contended that the issue was more complex than O&R's 
petition made it out to be, and requested an opportunity to 
supplement the record should the Commission decide to 
exercise jurisdiction. 
 
The NYPSC granted O&R's petition. The Commission 
determined that it had authority to review the petition 
because of its power to "interpret [its] power purchase 
contract approvals." App. at 172. The NYPSC found that 
O&R's petition could be read as a request for it to explain 
and interpret whether the earlier approval of the contract 
included the additional capacity created by the new 
turbine. The Commission concluded that "[u]nder the 
approval . . . Crossroads may not supplement electricity 
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produced by its [original] engine capacity with electricity 
produced from its new turbine capacity." App. at 173. 
Thus, the Commission ordered that electricity generated by 
the new turbine could not be priced at the contract rate. 
 
Crossroads then filed this action, seeking recovery for 
breach of contract and antitrust violations.3 O&R moved to 
dismiss Crossroads' claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim. Crossroads cross-moved for 
summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted 
O&R's motion and denied Crossroads' motion. The district 
court determined that: (1) the contract claims4 all are 
"premised on [Crossroads'] contention that[O&R] breached 
its obligations under the terms of the Agreement by 
refusing to pay the contract price for energy generated by 
the new gas turbine," Op. at 15; (2) Crossroads is barred by 
principles of issue and claim preclusion from litigating the 
issue of whether the agreement requires purchase of energy 
from the new turbine because that issue was litigated and 
determined before the NYPSC; (3) Crossroads' argument 
that the NYPSC did not have jurisdiction to construe the 
contract is also barred by operation of the "jurisdictional 
finality" rule of issue preclusion; and (4) Crossroads failed 
to sufficiently allege antitrust violations. After dismissing all 
Crossroads' claims, the district court then denied its cross- 
motion for summary judgment as moot. This appeal followed.5 
 
II. 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the district court with 
respect to Crossroads' contract claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Crossroads has preserved its right to appeal the NYPSC's 
determination by filing an appeal in the appropriate New York state 
court. The parties have by stipulation stayed that proceeding pending 
the outcome of this case. 
 
4. The claims involved are Crossroads' First, Second, Third, and Fourth 
causes of action, for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, anticipatory repudiation, and declaratory 
judgment. 
 
5. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1332 & 
1337. We have jurisdiction from the district court'sfinal order pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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A. 
 
Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, bars 
relitigation of issues adjudicated in a prior action. Federal 
courts are required to give preclusive effect to state court 
judgments by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Act, which 
provides that "Acts, records and judicial proceedings . . . 
shall have the same full faith and credit in every [federal] 
court . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of 
such State . . . from where they are taken." 28 U.S.C. 
S 1738; see Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 
1266 (3d Cir. 1994). By its terms, S 1738 applies only to 
state court decisions, and the Supreme Court has 
determined that the statute does not apply to 
administrative agency decisions that have not beenfirst 
reviewed by a state court. See University of Tennessee v. 
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986). However, the Court has 
"frequently fashioned federal common-law rules of 
preclusion in the absence of a governing statute." Id. Thus, 
we must determine whether an unreviewed decision of the 
NYPSC should be given preclusive effect. 
 
Though the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
preclusive effect of decisions of state agencies responsible 
for utility regulation, we are guided by several generally 
applicable criteria. The Court has determined that, unless 
a federal statute specifically indicates that state agency 
decisions should not be considered conclusive, as in the 
context of Title VII, Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795-96, and the Age 
Discrimination Act, Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1991), factualfindings of 
state agencies should be given the same preclusive effect 
they would be accorded in the courts of that state. See 
Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797; Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett 
Square, 4 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 1993). In addition, 
applying preclusive effect to legal conclusions made by 
state agencies "is favored as a matter of general policy, 
[though] its suitability may vary according to the specific 
context of the rights at stake, the power of the agency, and 
the relative adequacy of agency procedures." Astoria, 501 
U.S. at 109-10. 
 
In this case, we determine that the factual findings and 
legal conclusions of the NYPSC should be given preclusive 
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effect to the extent afforded under New York law. Unlike 
Astoria or Elliott, we find no provision of PURPA that seeks 
to limit common law rules of preclusion from applying to 
state agency decisions relating to utility regulation. Though 
PURPA does limit the authority of state agencies in some 
respects, e.g., by exempting cogeneration facilities from 
some regulation, PURPA still provides a substantial role to 
state agencies in regulating energy contracts between 
utilities and cogenerators. Indeed, state agencies are 
specifically required by federal law to implement FERC 
regulations. Given the substantial role given state utility 
agencies by Congress in enacting PURPA, we conclude 
Congress did not intend to prevent application of common 
law rules of preclusion. Thus, we will give preclusive effect 
to the NYPSC decision to the same extent as would the New 
York courts. Accord Long Island Lighting Co. v. IMO 
Industries, Inc., 6 F.3d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1993) (decision of 
NYPSC given preclusive effect). 
 
Crossroads also contends that, in particular, the NYPSC's 
determination that it had jurisdiction over O&R's petition 
should not be given preclusive effect in this action. Though 
recognizing that, generally speaking, a tribunal's 
determination of its own jurisdiction is accorded the same 
status for issue preclusion purposes as the merits of a 
dispute, see Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 (1963), 
Crossroads contends an exception to the rule applies in a 
case like this where a federal statute, PURPA, preempts the 
state agency from acting altogether. This more limited 
argument of Crossroads presents, in our judgment, a close 
question. We conclude that we need not resolve it, however, 
in light of our determination in subsection C below that the 
NYPSC decided an issue distinct from that to be decided in 
this case, and our determination in subsection D below 
that Crossroads' contract claims are not barred by claim 
preclusion. Accordingly, we assume, without deciding, that 
the Commission had the jurisdiction it purported to 
exercise with respect to O&R's petition. 
 
B. 
 
Under New York law, an issue adjudicated in a prior 
proceeding will have preclusive effect where (1) the "issue in 
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the present proceeding [is] identical to that necessarily 
decided in a prior proceeding" and (2) "in the prior 
proceeding the party against whom preclusion is sought 
was accorded a full and fair opportunity to contest the 
issue." Allied Chemical v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 
528 N.E.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. 1988).6 The district court, after 
examining the NYPSC decision, determined that these 
requirements were met and concluded that Crossroads' 
claims were precluded by the prior determination. See Op. 
at 19. On appeal, Crossroads challenges the determination 
that they were provided a "full and fair" opportunity to 
litigate before the NYPSC. See Appellant's Br. at 26, 33-35. 
 
Under New York law: 
 
       A determination whether the first action or proceeding 
       genuinely provided a full and fair opportunity requires 
       consideration of "the `realities of the [prior] litigation', 
       including the context and other circumstances which 
       . . . may have had the practical effect of discouraging 
       or deterring a party from fully litigating the 
       determination which is now asserted against him". 
       (People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 
       417 N.E.2d 518.) Among the specific factors to be 
       considered are the nature of the forum and the 
       importance of the claim in the prior litigation, the 
       incentive and initiative to litigate and the actual extent 
       of litigation, the competence and expertise of counsel, 
       the availability of new evidence, the differences in the 
       applicable law and the foreseeability of future litigation. 
       (Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 292, 441 N.Y.S.2d 
       49, 423 N.E.2d 807; Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 
       24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725.) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In addition, when applying issue preclusion to an administrative 
agency, New York courts are required to ascertain that the agency 
proceeding was "quasi-judicial" in nature; i.e., whether (1) the agency 
has the power to act adjudicatively, (2) the agency follows adequate fact- 
finding procedures, (3) the issue was fully aired, and (4) the parties 
expect to be bound by the decision. See Allied, 528 N.E.2d at 155. In 
Allied, New York's highest court determined that, judged by these 
criteria, a decision of the NYPSC was "quasi-judicial." The district court 
in this case agreed, and Crossroads provides no persuasive reason on 
appeal to conclude differently. 
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Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., 467 N.E.2d 487, 491 (N.Y. 
1984). These requirements are intended to make certain 
that the first tribunal carefully considered the issues 
litigated, and that the party against whom preclusion is 
sought had a chance to offer vigorous argument for its 
position. In this case, two issues of "full and fair" 
opportunity arise from the litigation before the NYPSC: (1) 
whether Crossroads was given a "full and fair" chance to 
argue the issue of the NYPSC's jurisdiction to address 
O&R's petition; and (2) whether Crossroads was given a 
"full and fair" opportunity to litigate the merits of the 
petition. 
 
The issue of whether Crossroads had a "full and fair" 
opportunity to argue, before the NYPSC, the issue of the 
NYPSC's own jurisdiction is straightforward. The parties 
both submitted briefs before the NYPSC outlining their view 
of the jurisdictional issue, including Crossroads' 
contentions that PURPA, FERC regulations, and the 
NYPSC's own practice prohibited jurisdiction over the 
interpretation of the contract. Crossroads' brief before the 
NYPSC mirrors the arguments made before us on appeal. 
The NYPSC opinion deciding the issue carefully considered 
each of Crossroads' arguments and reflects a considered 
analysis of its jurisdictional predicate. Reading the parties' 
submissions before the NYPSC, and the resulting decision, 
we believe, leads to the conclusion that Crossroads had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the agency's 
jurisdiction. 
 
The more debatable issue is whether Crossroads had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the merits of O&R's 
petition. In addition to determining that it had jurisdiction 
over O&R's petition, the NYPSC also proceeded to grant the 
petition, holding that "[u]nder [its] approval of the contract 
for the Crossroads site, [Crossroads] may not expand the 
generation production entitled to the contract pricing. . . . 
As a result, the expanded production made possible by 
Crossroads' new turbine is beyond the terms and 
conditions approved for this contract." App. at 173. 
 
In this appeal, Crossroads briefly argues that the 
NYPSC's consideration of the merits of O&R's petition did 
not offer Crossroads a "full and fair" opportunity to contest 
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the issue. Crossroads contends that it did not seek relief 
from the NYPSC or participate voluntarily in the agency's 
proceedings, that it solely contested the jurisdictional issue, 
and that it requested, and was denied, an opportunity to 
supplement the record before the NYPSC. Despite these 
arguments, we believe that Crossroads had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the merits of O&R's petition for 
declaratory relief before the NYPSC. 
 
Crossroads' argument that it did not seek relief before the 
NYPSC and did not voluntarily participate before the agency 
is not legally relevant to whether it had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the merits issue. Moreover, contrary 
to its assertion in its brief, Crossroads' submission before 
the NYPSC did argue the merits of the petition. Crossroads 
contended that the agreement could not be read to suggest 
that the original set of three 1.1 MW generators was the 
only capacity assumed by the parties, pointing to language 
in the agreement and exhibits demonstrating the intent of 
the parties at the time the contract was signed. That these 
arguments were not accepted by the NYPSC does not mean 
that Crossroads had an inadequate opportunity to present 
them. 
 
Crossroads also argues that the NYPSC did not heed its 
request to file additional materials before it rendered its 
decision on the merits of the petition. In its submission to 
the agency, Crossroads requested that "[s]hould the 
Commission determine that it will entertain O&R's request 
for a declaratory ruling, CROSSROADS respectively 
reserves its right to make a further submission that more 
fully describes the matters in dispute . . . ." App. at 120. 
However, the fact that Crossroads asked for a second 
opportunity to argue the issue does not establish that it did 
not have a "full and fair" first opportunity. Moreover, 
Crossroads has not pointed to any additional materials or 
arguments that it would have made before the NYPSC. 
Since Crossroads has not suggested that it would have 
made any additional arguments before the NYPSC, it is 
difficult to conclude that it did not have a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate on this ground. 
 
More importantly, looking only to Crossroads' opportunity 
to litigate before the NYPSC is not the legally relevant 
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perspective. The issue of a "full and fair" opportunity to 
litigate includes the possibility of a chain of appellate 
review. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 
456 U.S. 461, 484 (1982); Reubens v. New York City Dep't 
of Juvenile Justice, 930 F. Supp. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
Crossroads has an opportunity to appeal the NYPSC's 
decision through the state court system, and Crossroads 
will presumably have an opportunity in those proceedings 
to raise its claims regarding the merits of O&R's petition, as 
well as its contention that the NYPSC improperly denied its 
application to supplement the record. In short, in 
determining whether a litigant has been given a"full and 
fair" opportunity to litigate a claim, we must take into 
account the possibility of appellate review. Since such 
review is available in this case, and there is no allegation 
that it would be inadequate to consider Crossroads'  
arguments,7 Crossroads has been given a full and fair 
opportunity for preclusion purposes. 
 
C. 
 
In addition to the requirement of an opportunity to argue 
the merits, issue preclusion applies only when the issue in 
the present proceeding is "identical" to that decided in the 
prior proceeding. Allied, 528 N.E.2d at 155. Thus, 
application of claim preclusion is appropriate here only if it 
can be said that the issue decided by the NYPSC is the 
same issue that Crossroads, by filing its contract claims, 
has asked the district court to decide. Resolution of this 
issue requires that we examine with some care the law 
applicable to those claims and the specific grounds upon 
which the NYPSC rested its decision on the jurisdictional 
and merits issues. 
 
As we noted above, under PURPA and the regulations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. At oral argument Crossroads suggested that a restrictive standard of 
review in the New York state courts might limit its ability to litigate 
its 
position. However, these comments were not raised before oral 
argument. Moreover, we find no reason to believe that the standard of 
review applied by an appellate court would impair the ability of 
Crossroads to meaningfully make the arguments it has advanced before 
us. 
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adopted by the FERC, qualifying facilities like Crossroads 
are exempt from state utility-type regulation, including 
regulation of "rates of electric utilities." 18 C.F.R. 
S 292.602(c)(1). We have interpreted these regulations to 
prevent state regulatory commissions from modifying the 
terms of a power purchase agreement between a utility and 
cogeneration facility after it has been approved by the state. 
In other words, while PURPA allows the appropriate state 
regulatory agency to approve a power purchasing 
agreement, once such an agreement is approved, the state 
agency is not permitted to modify the terms of the 
agreement. To do so would be to engage in the utility-type 
regulation from which PURPA exempts QFs. 
 
This principle was recently articulated in Freehold 
Cogeneration Associates, L.P. v. Board of Regulatory 
Comm'rs of New Jersey, 44 F.3d 1178 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Freehold involved facts similar to those before us. A utility 
and cogenerator reached a twenty-year power purchase 
agreement at certain specified rates. The agreement was 
approved by the New Jersey regulatory board responsible 
for reviewing such agreements. After a year had passed 
under the contract, the utility, in response to lower costs 
for obtaining electrical power, notified the state board that 
it wished to modify the pricing structure of the agreement. 
The cogenerator rejected suggestions to renegotiate or agree 
to a buy-out offer to end the contract. The regulatory board 
then directed the cogenerator to renegotiate the rates under 
the agreement or agree to a buy-out. The cogeneratorfiled 
a complaint in the district court, seeking a declaratory 
judgment exempting it from the board's attempts to modify 
the agreement. The district court denied relief. On appeal, 
after determining jurisdiction, ripeness, and other 
challenges, we proceeded to discuss whether PURPA 
preempted the state regulatory board's order requiring 
renegotiation of the agreement. 
 
Noting that "PURPA and the implementing regulations 
establish an extensive federal system to encourage and 
regulate the sale of electrical energy by QFs," we 
determined that FERC, and not state regulatory agencies, 
were responsible for establishing the parameters governing 
power purchase agreements between utilities and qualifying 
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facilities. 44 F.3d at 1191. Though FERC did allow state 
agencies to approve such agreements, the implementation 
authority of state agencies end once an agreement is 
approved. After approval has been granted, "attempt[s] to 
either modify the [agreement] or revoke [state agency] 
approval is `utility-type' regulation -- exactly the type of 
regulation from which [a qualifying facility] is immune 
under [PURPA]." Id. at 1192. Thus, unless the qualifying 
authority waives its PURPA rights in the agreement, the 
federal law prevents the state from "reconsideration of its 
prior approval." Id. 
 
Not surprisingly, Crossroads cited our Freehold decision 
to the NYPSC in support of its contention that the 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to interpret the power 
purchase agreement. In response, the NYPSC expressly 
recognized the "contract non-interference policy" inherent 
in PURPA and acknowledged that it lacked jurisdiction to 
interpret the agreement. It carefully drew a distinction, 
however, between interpreting the agreement between the 
parties and interpreting its approval of that agreement, 
holding that it possessed jurisdiction to do the latter: 
 
        As was recently reaffirmed, it is within our authority 
       to interpret our power purchase contract approvals, 
       and that jurisdiction has been upheld by the courts. 
       The precedents involving interpretation of past policies 
       and approvals, and not the contract non-interference 
       policy that Crossroads cites, control here. As a result, 
       the approval of the original contract for the Crossroads 
       site may be explained and interpreted, and O&R's 
       petition may be construed as requesting that relief. 
       That approval was limited to a project consisting of 
       three reciprocating engines, sized at a net capacity of 
       3.3 MW, with an estimated annual electrical output of 
       26,300 MWh. Under the approval, therefore, 
       Crossroads may not supplement electricity produced 
       by its reciprocating engine capacity with electricity 
       produced from its new turbine capacity. 
 
App. at 172-73 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
 
The opinion of the NYPSC is devoid of any reference to 
the text of the agreement. In reaching its conclusion that its 
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"approval was limited to a project consisting of three 
reciprocating engines, sized at a net capacity of 3.3 MW," 
the Commission cites solely to a memorandum from its 
staff that describes the then existing cogeneration plant as 
"consist[ing] of three dual fuel engine-generator sets." App. 
at 137, 173. Consistent with its ruling on jurisdiction, the 
Commission's holding was carefully circumscribed to reflect 
only an interpretation of its approval: 
 
        Accordingly, we find and declare that the petition of 
       Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. is granted in part, 
       to the extent that the December 2, 1988 approval of 
       Contract No. E-139 between O&R and Onsite 
       (Crossroads' predecessor) is construed as limiting the 
       contract pricing to electric production from the three 
       reciprocating engine facility that was installed in 1987, 
       and does not extend to production from the gas-fired 
       turbine that was installed in 1996. 
 
App. at 174. The referenced "December 2, 1988 approval" is 
a Commission letter to the parties informing them that it 
had "accepted the contract and supplement" thereto 
"contingent upon . . . the contract being amended" in two 
detailed respects not relevant here. Neither side maintains 
before us that the required amendments were not made. 
 
It is thus apparent that the NYPSC, because of the 
limitations it perceived on its own jurisdiction, deliberately 
excluded from its deliberation any interpretation of the 
contract it approved on December 2, 1988. As a result, we 
conclude that it did not decide the issue presented by the 
contract claim in this case. 
 
As we understand the federal law applicable here, 
although a PURPA-governed agreement is unenforceable 
prior to approval by the relevant state agency, the rights of 
the parties, once their agreement receives such approval, 
are to be determined by applying normal principles of 
contract interpretation to their agreement. Thus, the 
district court in this case is being asked to determine from 
the approved agreement of the parties their intention with 
respect to O&R duty to purchase new capacity. This is an 
issue that the NYPSC expressly declined to address. 
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We do not suggest that a court asked to enforce a state 
approved PURPA governed agreement will never have 
occasion to consider the terms of the agency's approval. In 
some cases, those terms may be highly relevant in 
determining the parties' understanding of their respective 
rights and duties under the contract. Nothing in the 
approval granted here is helpful in that respect, however. 
Moreover, when those terms have relevance, they are 
relevant only in the context of the understanding of the 
parties as reflected in an objective reading of the agreement 
and its approval. An inquiry into the issues focused on by 
the Commission and its staff as reflected in its internal 
records is not relevant. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the issue decided by the 
NYPSC does not have preclusive effect with respect to the 
issues presented by Crossroads' contract claims. 
 
D. 
 
In addition to issue preclusion, the district court also 
determined that Crossroads' contract claims were barred by 
claim preclusion. Operation of claim preclusion, or res 
judicata, enforces the principle that a final judgment of a 
claim on the merits between the same parties resolves both 
that claim and all others arising out of the same 
transaction. See Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., 467 
N.E.2d 487, 489-90 (N.Y. 1984). Applying this doctrine, the 
district court concluded that Crossroads' contract claims 
"were already litigated between these parties before the 
NYPSC, which reached a final determination of those claims 
on the merits." Op. at 18. We disagree. 
 
New York courts have adopted a "transactional" approach 
to res judicata, meaning that "once a claim is brought to a 
final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if 
based upon different theories or if seeking a different 
remedy." O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 
1159 (N.Y. 1981); see also Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. 
Nieberg Realty Corp., 165 N.E. 456, 457 (N.Y. 1929) 
(Cardozo, C.J.) ("A judgment in one action is conclusive in 
a later one, not only as to any matters actually litigated 
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therein, but also as to any that might have been so litigated 
. . . ."). This principle has been applied by New York courts 
in cases where a defense or counterclaim used in one 
action is asserted in a later action. See, e.g. , Board of 
Managers of Windridge Condominiums One v. Horn, 651 
N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Lippman v. Lippman, 
612 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). Thus, if O&R had 
brought its declaratory judgment action in a New York 
court of general jurisdiction, rather than the NYPSC, asking 
for a declaration that it had no duty to buy additional 
power under the agreement, Crossroads would have to 
come forward with any and all grounds it might have to 
assert that this duty exists. If so, then under traditional 
claim preclusion principles Crossroads would be bound by 
an adverse declaratory judgment whether or not the court 
expressly ruled on the meaning of the contract. 
 
Nevertheless, we predict that New York courts would not 
apply claim preclusion in the circumstances now before us. 
Crossroads was taken involuntarily before the NYPSC, and 
it asserted a jurisdictional argument there. The 
Commission, as we have read its opinion above, accepted 
that defense to the extent that O&R was asking for a 
contract interpretation. It went out of its way to hold that 
it was without jurisdiction to grant such relief but that it 
did have jurisdiction to interpret its approval. Accordingly, 
we think this is a situation of the kind described in the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments: 
 
       S 26. Exceptions to the General Rule Concern ing 
       Splitting 
 
       (1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the 
       general rule of S 24 does not apply to extinguish the 
       claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as a 
       possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff 
       against the defendant: . . . 
 
        (c) The plaintiff was unable to rely on a cert ain 
       theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form 
       of relief in the first action because of the limitations on 
       the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or 
       restrictions on their authority to entertain multiple 
       theories or demands for multiple remedies or forms of 
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       relief in a single action, and the plaintiff desires in the 
       second action to rely on that theory or to seek that 
       remedy or form of relief . . . . 
 
New York courts, applying this provision, have created an 
exception to claim preclusion in situations where the first 
tribunal lacks jurisdiction to offer the relief sought in the 
second proceeding. Compare Handy v. Westbury Teachers 
Ass'n, 104 A.D.2d 923, 925-26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (state 
agency that "declined to adjudicate [plaintiffs] contentions 
on these issues . . . holding that it lacked . . . jurisdiction 
leaves plaintiffs free to raise those same contentions in 
[later] action") with Pauk v. Board of Trustees of the City 
Univ. of N.Y., 111 A.D.2d 17, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (res 
judicata applies where grounds for recovery "was entirely 
available to plaintiff as a basis for relief " in the prior 
proceeding). Because the contract claims were unavailable 
to Crossroads before the NYPSC, we hold that claim 
preclusion was improperly applied in this case. 
 
E. 
 
In reaching the conclusion that the district court is free 
to decide Crossroads' contract claims on their merits, we 
are mindful of the fact that the NYPSC's opinion ultimately 
declared that O&R owes no duty to purchase at the 
contract rate energy generated by Crossroads in excess of 
3.3 MW but less than 4 MW. This can be, and in most 
circumstances would properly be, viewed as a declaration 
on the same issue presented to the district court by 
Crossroads' contract claims. Had the Commission regarded 
itself as having jurisdiction to consider the terms of the 
contract, the district court would clearly be barred from 
proceeding on the contract claims by both issue and claim 
preclusion. But the Commission's opinion makes it 
indisputably clear that it drew a careful distinction between 
interpreting the intent of the parties as reflected in their 
approved agreement and interpreting the intent of the 
Commission and then concluded that it had no jurisdiction 
to do the former. Given that Crossroads' contract claims 
rest solely on the intent of the parties as reflected in the 
contract, we can remain faithful to the principles 
underlying S 26 of the Restatement and the New York cases 
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embracing it only by looking beneath the Commission's 
ultimate conclusion to its foundation., i.e., its 
determination that in 1988 it had considered and 
subjectively approved only the sale of energy from the 
existing facilities at the contract price. Because the 
Commission considered itself without jurisdiction to 
consider the argument that Crossroads was making, 
Crossroads remains entitled to its day in the district court. 
 
III. 
 
In its fifth cause of action, Crossroads accuses O&R of 
monopolization and attempted monopolization, in violation 
of S 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2, and price 
discrimination, in violation of S 2 of the Clayton Act, as 
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 13. 
Crossroads alleges that O&R's refusal to purchase energy 
from Crossroads pursuant to the agreement has helped 
unfairly solidify O&R's monopoly position in its service 
area. In addition, Crossroads alleges that O&R has impeded 
its attempts to sell its excess energy to customers in O&R's 
service area by offering those customers lower prices. The 
district court dismissed Crossroads cause of action on both 
theories for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Crossroads 
contends that its complaint is sufficient to survive 
dismissal. We agree with this aspect of the district court's 
decision. 
 
The district court correctly determined that Crossroads' 
Sherman Act claims should be dismissed. Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act provides that "[e]very person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony . . . ." 15 U.S.C.S 2. To state a 
claim for monopolization, a plaintiff must allege "(1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historical accident." Schuylkill Energy Resources v. 
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 412-13 (3d 
Cir.) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 435 
(1997). To state a claim for attempted monopolization, a 
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plaintiff must allege "(1) that the defendant has engaged in 
predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific 
intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power." Schuylkill, 113 F.3d at 413. 
 
The district court determined that Crossroads had failed 
to allege a relevant market or sufficient monopoly power to 
state a claim under the Sherman Act. The court held that: 
 
       [P]laintiff fails, as a matter of law, to sufficiently allege 
       monopoly power. Plaintiff merely states that defendant 
       is the sole provider of electricity to certain customers in 
       the counties it services. . . . Plaintiff fails to allege such 
       necessary facts as defendant's market share in the 
       markets in which plaintiff is a competitor or that 
       barriers that exist which prevent plaintiff 's entry into 
       such markets. These deficiencies in the Complaint 
       mandate dismissal of plaintiff 's Sherman Act claims. 
       See Barr Lab, Inc. v. Abbott Lab, 978 F.2d 98, 112-13 
       (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Op. at 9. We agree with the district court's reasoning. 
 
Alleging market share alone is not sufficient to state a 
claim under the Sherman Act. Monopolization or threatened 
monopolization requires something more, which may 
include "the strength of competition, probable development 
of the industry, the barriers to entry, the nature of the anti- 
competitive conduct, and the elasticity of consumer 
demand." Barr Labs, 978 F.2d at 112. Crossroads has not 
alleged any of these factors. Nor is it likely that it could 
have done so. Crossroads admits that it acts as a 
competitor to O&R in selling its excess capacity in O&R's 
service area, and it provides no reason why it is prevented 
from doing so in the future. The complaint simply fails to 
allege anything to suggest monopolization by O&R 
cognizable by the Sherman Act. 
 
The district court also did not err in dismissing 
Crossroads' price discrimination claim under the Robinson- 
Patman Act. Crossroads alleges that O&R approached its 
excess capacity customer and offered to sell it electricity at 
a lower price than that offered by Crossroads, that the 
reduced price was not offered to all customers, and that 
such action constitutes a violation of the Robinson-Patman 
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Act. The Robinson-Patman Act, which amended the Clayton 
Act, prohibits price discrimination "where the effect of such 
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. S 13(a). In order to 
state a claim under the Robinson-Patman Act, a plaintiff 
must allege facts to demonstrate that (1) the defendant 
made at least two contemporary sales of the same 
commodity at different prices to different purchasers; and 
(2) the effect of such discrimination was to injure 
competition. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219-27 (1993). 
 
The district court dismissed Crossroads' claim because it 
failed to allege that O&R made any sales of energy at 
different prices. The complaint merely alleges that O&R has 
"offered" to sell electricity at a rate lower than that charged 
by Crossroads. Crossroads does not deny this infirmity, but 
contends that since O&R is virtually the sole provider of 
electricity in its service area that there is "danger" that O&R 
will abuse its market power in competing with smaller 
suppliers like Crossroads. See Appellant's Br. at 47. This 
position is not supported by any citation to authority and 
suggests that Crossroads' claim is based on at a speculative 
threat of future competitive injury, which would not be ripe 
for determination in any event. Merely offering lower prices 
to a customer does not state at a price discrimination claim.8 
 
Even if the offer of lower prices were sufficient to survive 
dismissal, Crossroads has failed to sufficiently plead the 
second element of a price discrimination claim: injury to 
competition. Crossroads has made no allegation of 
predatory conduct in any offers to customers that O&R has 
made, nor has it alleged any other competitive effect of 
O&R's offer. The mere fact of O&R's market share does not 
mean that approaching Crossroads' customer is an 
antitrust violation, so something additional must be alleged 
in order to survive dismissal. See Barr Labs, 978 F.2d at 
106-07. Crossroads has not alleged any anticompetitive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As the district court noted, at least two other circuits have required 
dismissal when two sales are not alleged. See Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. 
v. Burlington Indus., 763 F.2d 604, 615 (4th Cir. 1985); Fusco v. Xerox 
Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 337 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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effect, such as below-market prices, or any other indicia of 
anticompetitive behavior. Crossroads' monopolization and 
price discrimination claims simply come up short. 
 
IV. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be reversed, and 
the matter will be remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.9 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As we noted above, the district court denied Crossroads' cross-motion 
for summary judgment as moot. In light of our decision, the motion is no 
longer moot, but we decline to reach its merits since it has not been 
briefed before us nor first addressed by the district court. 
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